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THE CONSTRUCTIONIST ANALYTICS
OF INTERPRETIVE PRACTICE
James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium

.., or the last half century, qualitative inquiry has focused
increasingly on the socially constructed character of lived
realities (see Denzin & Lincoln , 2005; Holstein & Gubrium,
2008). Much of this has centered on the interactional constitutiona! meaning in everyday life, the leading principle being that
the world we live in and our place in it are not simply and evi dently "there;' but rather variably brought into being. Everyday
realities are actively constructed in and through forms of social
action. 'lbe principle supplies the basis for a constructionist
I perspective on qualitative inquiry that is both an intellectual
movement and an empirical research perspective that transcends particular disciplines:
With its growing popularity, however, the constructionist
approach has become particularly expansive and amorphous.
Often it seems that the lerm "constructionism" can be applied to
virlually every research approach imaginable. James Jasper and
Jeff Goodwin (2005), for example, have wryly noted, "We are all
i social constructionists; almost" (p. 3). But there is a drawback
to this popularity, because, as Michael Lynch (2008) suggests,
the perspective may have become too diverse and diffuse to
' adequately detlnc' or assess. In the process, constructionism
sometimes loses its conceptual bearings.
Elsewhere (Holstein & Gubrium, 2008), we have argued that
constructionism resists a single portrait but is better understood
as a mosaic of research eftorls, with diverse (but also shared)
philosophical, theoretical, methodological, and empirical underpinnings. This does not mean, however, that just anything goes
lInder the constructionist rubric. We should resist the temptation
to conflate constructionism with other contemporary or postmodern modes of qualitative inquiry; it is not synonymous with
symbolic interactionis'ln, social phenomenology, or ethnometh·
odology, for example, even as it shares their abiding concerns
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with the dynamics of social interaction. Nor should we equate all
variants of constructionism.
Darin Weinberg (2008) has argued that two important
threads weave throughout the mosaic of conmuctionist
thought: antifoundationalist sensibilities and a resistance to
reiBcation. These threads, of course, also wend through early
stlitementsof analytic philosophy, critical theory, pragmatism,
and the hermeneutic tradition -(see Weinberg, 2008). Joel Best
(2008) traces the origins of the term "social constructionism"
within sociology as far back as the early-20th century. He notes
numerous appearances of the term in disciplines as varied as
anthropology, history, and political sdence in the earlier parts
of that century. At the same time, proto-constructionist sensi·
biliries were evident in the work of a variety of scholars induding W. 1. Thomas (193 1), George Herbert Mead (1934), Alfred
Schutz (1962, 1964, 1967, 1970), and Herhert llIumer (1969),
among many others. Best, however, suggests that the expansive
. popularity of the pcrspective, or perhaps the term, burst forth in
the wake of the 1966 publication of Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the

Sociology of Knowledge.
.
This chapter outlines the development of a constructionist
analytics of interpretive practice, a particular variant of construCtionist inquiry. In our view, the approach unites enough
common elements to cunstitute a recognizable, vibrant research
program. The program centers on tJre interactional constitution
of lived realities within discernible contexts of social interaction. We use the term "analytic." because the approach and its
variants produce understandings of the construction process by
way of distinctive analytic ,'ocabularies, what Blwnel' (i969)
might ha,'e called a systematically linked set of "sensitizing
concepts" spare enough not to overshadow the empirical, yet
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robust enough to reveal its constructionist distinctive contours.
Our analytics of interpretive practice is decidedly theoretical,
not just descriptive, but concertedly minimalist in its conceptual thrust. The chapter's aim is neither historic nor comprehensive. Rather, it looks more narrowly at the development of a
particular strain of constructionist studies that borrows liberally, if somewhat promiscuously, from the traditions of social
phenomenology, ethnomethodology, ordinary language philosophy, and foucauldian discourse analysis.
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STR ATEGlES Of IKQUIRY

CONCEPTUAL SOlJ]KES

The constructionist analyt ics of interpretive practice has diverse
sources. For decades, constructionist researchers have attempted
to document the agentie processes- the haws-by"which
social reality is constructed, managed, and sustained. Alfred
Schutls (1962, 1964, 1967, 1970) social phenomenology, Berger
and Luckmann's (1966) social constfllctionism;' ancf ptocessoriented strains of symbolic interactionism (e.g., Blumer, 1969;
Hewitt, 1997; Weigert, 1981) have offered key elements to this
constructionist project. More reccntly, ethnomethodology and
conversation analysis (CA) have atguably supplied a more communicatively detailed dimension by specifying the interactive
procedures thtough. which social order is accomplished (see'
lluckholdt & Gubrium, 1979; Garfmkel, 1967,2002,2006; Heritage, 1984; Holstein, 1993; Lynch, 1993; Maynard & Clayman,
1991; Mehan & Wood, 1975; Pollner, 1987, \ 991 ).1 Discursive
constructionism (see Pottet & Hepburn, 2008)-a variant of
discourse analysis bearing strong resemblances to CA- also
has emerged to examine everyday descriptions, claims, reports,
assertions, and allegations as they contribute to the construetion and maintenance of social order.
Arelated set of concerns has emerged along with ethnometho~ologis traditional interest in how social action and order are
accomplished, reffecting a heretofore suspended intere,t in what
is being accomplished, under what conditions, and out of what
resources. Such traditionally naturali,tic questions hal'e been
revived, with greater analytic sophi,tication and with a view
toward the rich, varied, and conse'luential conte,,'ts of social
construction. Analyse, of reality construction are now re-engaging
questions conccrnulg the broad cultural and the institutional
contexts of meaning making and social order. The empirical
horizons, while still centered on processes of social accomplishment, are increasingly viewed in terms of what we have called
"interpretive practice" - the constellation of procedure" condi·
tions, and resourc~s through which reality is apprehended,
undwtood, organized, and conveyed in everyday life (Gubrium
& Holstein, 1997; Holstein, 1993; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000b).
The idea of interpretive practice turns us to both the hows and
, the whats of social reality; its empirical purview relares to both
how people methodically construct their experiences and their

worlds and the contextual configurations of meaning and insti·
tutional life that inform and shape reality-constituting activity.
Thi, attention to both the hows and the whats of the social construction process echoes Karl Marx's (1956) ma.xim that people
ac tively construct their worlds but not completely on, or in, their
own terms.
Thi, concern for constructive action-in-context not only
makes it possible to understand more tully the construction
process, but also foregrounds the realities themselves that enter
into and are reflexively produced by the process. Attending
closely to the how,' of the construction process informs us of the
mechanisms by which social forms are brought into being in
everyday life, but it may shortchange the shape and distribution '
of these realities in their own right. The whats of social reality
tend to be deemphasized in research that attends exclusively to
the haws of its construction. We lose track of consequential
whats, wilens, and where> that locate the concrete, yet con·
structed, realities that emerge.
Ethnomethodological Sensibilities
Ethnomethodology is perhaps the quintessential howana·
lytic enterprise in qualitative inquiry. While indebted to Edmund
Hu>serl's (1970) philosophical phenomenology and Schutz's >"
social phenomenology (sec Holstein & Gubrium, 1994), ethnuc t ;;,
,i;etliot!-()Iogyslruck a new course, addressing the
order by combining a "phlelli>meno1log:ical sensilbility" I(Maynanl
& Clayman, 1991) with a paramount research concern for
mechanisms of practical action (Garfmkel, 1967; Lynch,
From an ethnomethodological standpoint, the social
iacticity is accompli,hed by way of members' discernible
ac tional work, the mechanics of which produces and ma!inta,illS,::
the accountable circumstances of their lives.' Ettmomellho(jQI~, !
g i~ts focus on how members (ldo" sociallifc, aiming in particullif; ,
to doc ument the distinct processes by which they con,:retel~l'.
construct and stlstain d,e objects and appearances of the
Iforld. The central phenomenon of interest is the in situ
ied activity and the practical production of accounts (M('YllOJd, ;
2003). This leads to inquiries into how mundane practices are
actually carried out, such as doing gender (Garfinkel, 1%1),couqting people and things (sec Martin & Lynch, 2009), or
delivering good or bad news (see Maynard, 2003).
The policy of"ethnomethodological indifference" ('Ciarfinkcl '. "
& Sa cks, 1970) prompts ethnotnethodologists to tempO[(lf4Y':
suspend all commitments to a priori or privileged versiarlS 9t ':'
the social world. This turn, the researcher's attention to
members accomplish a sense of social order. Social realities ".•
stich as crime or mental illness are not taken for "'o,,,,,,i·
iostead, belief in them is temporarily ",spended in order
make visible how they become realities for those rnnlcernRl ','
This brings into view the ordinary constitutive work
duces the locally unchallenged appearance of stable
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Chapter 20 '1be Constructionist Analytics of Interpretive Practice
This policy vigorously resists judgmental characterizations of
thecorreetness of members' activities (see Lynch, 2008). Contrary to the common sociological tendency to ironicize and
criticize commonsense formulations from the standpoint of
.
correct sociological understanding, ethnomethodology takes members' practical reasoning for what it iscircumstantially adequate ways of interpersonally constitutthe world at hand. The abiding 'guideline is succinctly
conveyt:dby Melvin PoUner's "Don't argue with the members!"
(pel:sonal communication; see Gubrium & Holstein, 2011).
Ethnomethodological research is keenly attuned to naturally
occurring talk and social interaction, orienting to them as con~itutive elements of the settings studied (see Atkinson & Drew,
;979; Maynard, 1984, 1989,2003; Mehan & Wood, 1975; Sacks,
. 1972). This has taken different empirical directions, in part
depending upon whether the occasioned dynamics of social
action and practical reasoning or the structure of talk is emphasized. Ethnographic stud.ies tend to focus on locally accountable
iocial action and the settings within which soci.al interaction
I
the practical realities in question. Such studies con~der the situated content of talk in relation to local meaning
stnrctures (see Gubrium, 1992; Holstein, 1993; Lynch & Bogen,
Miller, 1991; Pollner, 1987; Wieder, 1988). They combine
attention to how social action and order is built up in everyday
communication with detailed descriptions of place settings as
those settings and their local understandings and perspectives
sem to mediate the meaning of what is said in the course of
sodal interaction. The texts produced from such analytics are
descriptive of everyday life, with both conversational
emacts from the settings and ethnographic accounts of interaction being used to convey the methodical production of the
matter in question. To the extent the analysis of talk in
to social interaction and setting is undertaken, this
to take the form of (non-Foucauldian) discourse analysis,
more or less critically orients to how talk, conversation,
other communicative_processes are used to organize social
Variations on this analytic have also emergedin a form
of discuLrsi'le constructionism that resonates strongly with ethnoml.ethodclloi(y and CA, but orients more to epistcmics and
(kntlwle'dge construction (Potter & Hepburn, 2008; also see
;~ik,andt'r, 2008; Potter, 1996, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987;
.n"". ., L""",' Wooffitt, 2005).
Studies that emphasize the structure of talk itself focu s on the
,"",,,,,ltin,nal "machinery"through which social acti.on emerges.
focus here is on the .sequential, utterance-by-utterance,
structuring features of talk or "talk-in-interaction;' a
term of reference in conversation analysis (see Heritage,
. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Silverman, 1998; Zim1988). The analyses produced from such studies are
explications of the communicative processes by which
methodically and sequentially construct their concerns
conversational practice. Often bereft of ethnographic detail
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except for brieflead-ins that describe place settings, the analytic
sense conveyed is that biographical and social particulars can
be understood as artifacts of the unfolding conversational
machinery, although the analysis of what is called "institutional
talk" or "talk at work" has struck a greater balance with place
settings in this regard (see.for example, Drew & Heritage, 1992).
While some contend that Clls connection to ethnomethodology
is tenuous because of this lack of concern with ethnographic
detail (Atkinson, 1988; Lynch, 1993; Lynch & Bogen, 1994; for
counterarguments see Maynard & Clayman, 1991 and ten Have,
1990), CA clearly shares ethnomethodology's interest in the
local and methodical construction of social action (Maynard &
Clayman, 1991).
Recently, Garfinkel, 1.ynch, and others have elaborated what
they refer to as a "postanalytic" ethnomethodology that is less
inclined to universalistic generalizations regarding the enduring structures or machinery of social interaction (see Garfinkel,
2002,2006; Lynch, 1993; Lynch & Bogen, 1996). This program of
research centers on the highly localized competencies that constitute specific domains of everyday "work;' especially the
(bench)work of astronomers (Garfinkel, Lynch , & Livingston,
198 1), biologists and neurologists (Lynch, 1985), forensic scientists (Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jenkins, 2008) and mathematicians (Livingston, 1986), among many others. The aim is to
'document the "haecceit}'" - the "just thisness" -of social practices withilr circumscribed dQmains of knowledge and activity
(l.ynch, 1993). The practical details of the real-time work of
these activities are viewed as an incarnate feature ofthe knowledges they produce. It is impossible to separate the knowledges
from the highly particularized occasions of their production.
The approach is theoretically minimalist in that it resists a priori conceptualization or categorization, especially historical
time, while advocating detailed descriptive studies of the specific, local practices that manifest order and render it accountable (Bogen & Lynch, 1993).
Despite their success at displaying a panoply of social production practices, CA and postanalytic ethnomcthodology in
their separate ways tend to di sregard an important balance in
the conceptualizations of talk, setting, and social interaction
that was evident in Garfinkel's early work and Harvel' Sacks's
(1992) pioneering lectures on conyersational practice (see
Silverman, 1998). Neither Gartinkel nor Sacks envisioned the
machinery of conversation as productive of recognizable social
forms in its own right. Attention to the constitutive hows of
social realities was balanced with an eye to the meani ngful
whats. Settings, cultural understandings, and their everyday
mediations were viewed as reflexively interwoven with talk and
social interaction. Sacks, in particular, understood culture to be
a matter of practice, something that served as a resource for
discerning the possible linkages of utterances and exchanges.
Whether they wrote of (Garfinkel's) "good organizational reasons" or (Sacks's) "membership categorization devices;' both
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initially avoided the reduction of social practice to highly localized or momentary haecceities of any kind.
Some of the original promise of ethnomethodology may
have been short-circuited as CA and postanalytic ethnomethodology have increasingly restricted their investigations to the
relation between social practices and the immediate accounts of
those practices (see Pollner 20lla, 2011b, 20llc). A broader
constructionist analytics aims to retain ethnomethodology's
interactional sensibilities while extending its scope to both the
constitutive and constituted whats of everyday life. Michel Foucault, among others, is a valuable resource for such a project.
Foucauldian Illspirations
If ethnomethodology documents the accomplishment of
everyday life at the interactional level, Foucault undertook a
parallel project in a different empirical register. Appearing on
the analytic stage at about the same time as ethnomethodology
in the early 1960s, Foucault considers how historically and culturally located systems of power/knowledge construct subjects
and their worlds. Foucauldians refer to these systems as "discourses;' emphasizing that they are not merely bodies of ideas,
ideologies, or other symbolic formulations, but are also working
attitudes, modes of address, terms of reference, and courses of
action suffused into social practices. Fuucault (1972, p. 48) himself explains that discourses are not "a mere intersection of
things and words: an obscure web of things, and a manifest,
visible, colored chain of words." Rather, they are "practices that
systematically form the objects [and subjectsI of which they
speak" (p. 49). Even the design of buildings such as prisons
reveals the social logic that specifies ways of interpreting
persons and the physical and social landscapes they occupy
(Follcault, 1979).
Similar to the ethnomethodological view of the reflexivity of
social interaction, Foucault views discourse as operating reflexively, at once b.oth constituting and meaningfully describing the
world and its subjects. But, for Foucault, the accent is as much
on the constructive whats that discourse constitutes as it is on
the hows of discursive technology. While this implies an analytic emphasis on the culturally "natural;' Foucault's treatment
of discourse as social practice suggests, in particular, the
importance of understanding the practices of subjectivity. If he .
offers a vision of subject' and objects constituted through discourse, he also allows for all unwittingly active subiect who
simultaneously shapes and puts discourse to work in constructing o~r inner lives and social worlds (Best & Kellner, 1991;
Foucault, 1988) .
Foucault is particularly concerned with social locations or
institutional sites- the asylum, the hospital, and the prison, for
example-that specify the practical operation of discourses,
lin king the discourse of particular subjectivities with tlle construction of lived experience. like ethnomethodology, there is

an interest in the constitutive quality of systems of
is an orientation to practice that views lil'ed
subjectivities as always already embedded and
their discursive conventions.
Several commentators have pointed to the
what Foucault (1980) refers to as systems of"po~;erl\:n(
(or discourses) and ethnomethodology's fornllliatiol
constitutive power oflanguage use (Atkinson,
& Holstein, 1997; Heritage, 1.997; Miller, 1997b;
Prior, 1997; Silverman, 1993). The conresponden,,:sug!
what Foucault's analytics ·documents historically as
in-practice" in varied institutional or cultural sites
counterpart in what ethnomethodology's
((discursive practice" in varied forms of social
(Holstein & Gubrium, 2000b, 2003)' We use
discourses-in-practice and discursive pra,ctICl'~11h1
the chapter to flag the parallel concerns.
While ethnomethodologists and Foucauldiaus
different intellectual traditions and work in distinct
registers, their similar concerns for social ora,:ti,,:,'"
they both attend to the constitutive reflexivity
Neither discursive practice nor discOllfS<:-in-practicei:
as being caused or explained by external social
nal motives. Rather, they are taken to be the one:ratin,
nism of social life itself, as actuaUy known or
tcal time and in concce.te places. For both, "nm"'" Ii,
articulation of distinctive forms of social life as
the application of particular reSOLlrces by some to
lives of others. While discourses-in-practice are
"regimens/regimes" or lived patterns of action
(historically and institutionally) "discipline"
adherents' worlds, and discursive practice is
dynamics of talk and interaction that constitute
the practices reter in common to the lived
accomplishment of society.
[f ethnomethodologists emphasize how merllbersU!
day methods to account for their activities and
Foucault (1979) makes us aware of the re.lated
possibility for what the results are likely to ur. I'U! '''illl
Western postindustrial society, to seriously think
and voodoo as equally viable paradigms for
sickness and healing would seem idiosyncratic,
ous, in most conventional situations. The po.,.er (IE
discourse partially lies in its ability to be "seen
in its ability to appear as the only possibility wDJUe om,
bilities are outside the plausible realm.
It bears repeating that both ethnonllet~,odc,lqgll
foucauldian approaches to empirical material
not explanatory theories in the causal sense.
understood, theory purports to explain the state of
question. It responds to why concerns, such as
cide rate is rising or why individuals are suffering
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Ethnomethodology and the Fo ucauldian project, in contrast,
aim to am . . \'er how it .i s that individual experience is understood in particular terms such as these. They are pretheoretical
this sense, respectively seeking to arrive at an understandingofhow the subject matter of theory comes into existence
in the first place, and of what the subject of theory might
possibly become, The parallel lies in the common goal of
documenting the practiced stuff of such realities,
Still , this remains a parallel -not a shared-scheme.
Because Foucault's project (and most foucauldian projects)
operates in a historical register, real-time talk and social interaction are understandably missing from empirical materials
uader examination (but see Kendall & Wickham , 1999, for
example). While Foucault himself points to sharp turns in the
discursive formations that both shape and inform the shifting
realities of varied institutional spheres, contrasting extant social
forms with the ''birth'' of new ones, he provides little or no sense
of the everyday interact ional technology by which this is
achieved (see Atkinson, 1995, Holstein & Gubrium, 2000b), Certainly, h, elaborates the broad birth of new technologies, such as
theemergence of new regimes of surveillance in medicine and
modern criminal justice systems (Foucault, 1975, 1979), but he
does not provide us with a view of how these operate on the
ground. The everyday hows, in other words, are largely missing
from Foucauldian analyses.
Conversely, ethnomethodology's commitment to documenting the real-time, interactive processes by which social action
and order arc rendered visible and accountable precludes a
broad substantive perspective on constitutive resources, possibilities, and limiLalions, Such whats are largely absent in ethnomethodological work. It is one thing to show in interactive detail
that our everyday encounters with reality are ongoing aCCOffipli,hments, bUL it is quite another to derive an understanding of
what the general parameters of those everyday encounters
might be, The machinery of talk-in-interaction tells us little
about the maS5ive resources that are taken up in, and that guide,
the operation of conversation, or about the consequences of
producing particular results and not others, each of which is an
important ingredient of practice. Members speak their worlds
and their subjectivities, but they also articulate particular.forms
of life as they do so, foucauldianconsiderations offer ethnomethodology an analytiC sensitivity Lo the discursive opportunities and possibilities at work in talk and social interaction,
without casting them as external templates tor the everyday
production of social ordeL .

D1MF.NSIONS OF CO)!STRCCTlO)!IST ANALYTICS

The cOllstrucljonist analytics of interpretive practice rellects
, both ethoomethodologieal and Foucauldian impulses, It capi: talizel on key sensibilities from their parallel projects, but it is
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not simply another attempt at bridging the so-called macromicro divide, That debate usually centers on the question of
how to conceptualize the relationship between preexisting
larger and smaller social forms, the assumption being that
these are categorically distinct an4 separately discernible.
Issues raised in the debate perpetuate the distinction between,
say, social systems on the one hand, and social interaction, on
the other,
In contrast, those who consider the ethnomethodological
and Foucauldian projects to be parallel operations focus their
attention instead on Lhe interactional, institutional, and cultural
variabi lities of socially constituting discursive practice or discourses-in-practice, as the case might be, They aim to document how the social construction process is shaped across
various domains of everyday life, not in how separate theories
of macro and micro domains can be linked together for a fuller
account of social organization, Doctrinaire accounts of Garfinkel, Sacks, Foucault, and others may continue to sustain a variety of distinct projects, but these projects are not likely to
inform one another; nor will they lead to profitable dialogue
between dogmatic practitioners who insist on viewing themselyes as speaking different analytic languages, In our \~ew,
what we need is an openness to new, perhaps hybridized, analylics of reality comtruction at the crossroads of institutions,
,culture, and social interaction.
Beyond Ethnomethodology
Some ethnomethodologieally informed varieties of CA have
turned in this direction by analyzing the sequential machinery
of talk-in-interaction as it is patterned by institutional context,
bringing a greater concern for the whats of social life into the
picture. Some field-based studies with ethnomethodological
sensibilities have extended their conCerns beyond the narrow
holVs of social interaction to include a wider interest in what is
produced through interaction, in response to whal social conditions, Still other forms of discourse analysis have similarly
focu sed on the discursive resources brought to bear in situated
social. interaction or the kinds of objects and subjects constituted though interact ion (see Wooffitt, 2005). These trends have
broadened the empi ri.cal and analytic purview,
CA studies of "talk at work;' for example, aim to specify how
tile "simplest systematics" of ordinary conversation (Sacks,
Schegloft; & Jefferson, 1974) is shaped in various ways by tile
reflexively constructed speech envirorunents of particular interactional regimes (see Boden & Zimmerman, 199 1; Drew &
Heritage, 1992), Ethnomethodologically oriented ethnographers approach the problem from another direction by asking
how institutions and their respective subjcctivities ate brought
into being, managed, and sustained in and through members'
social interaction (or "reality work") (see Atkinson, 1995;
Dingwall, Eekelaar, & Murray, 1983; Emerson, 1969; Emerson
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& Messinger, 1977; Gubrium, 1992; Holstein, 1993, Mehan, 1979;
Miller, 1991, 1997a). Foucault has even been inserted explicitly
into the discussion, as researcbers have drawn links between
everyday discursive practice and discourses-in-practice to document in local detail how the formulation of everyday texts such
as psychiatric case records or coroners' reports reproduce institutional discourses (see Prior, 1997). Others taking related paths
have noted how culturally and institutionally situated discourses are interactionally brought to bear, to produce social
objects and institutionalized interpersonal practices (sec Hcpburn,
1997, and Gubrium & Holstein, 2001).
In their own fashions, these efforts consider both the hows
and the whats of reality construction. Rut thisis analytically
risky business. Asking how questions without having an integral
way of getting an analytic handle on what questions renders
concerns with the wltat.' rather arbitrary. While talk-ill-interaction
is locally "artful;' as Garfinkel (1967) puts it, not just anything
gocs. On the other hand, if we swiog too far analytically in the
direction of contextual or cultural imperatives, we end up with
the cultural, institutional, or judgmental "dopes" that Gartlnkel
(l967) decried.

Accenting AnalytiCInterplay
To broaden and enrich cthnomethodology's analytic scope--__
and repertoire, researchers have extended its purview to the
institutional and cultural whats that come into play in social
interaction. This has not been a historical extension, SUdl as
Foucault might pursue, although that certainly is not ruled out_
In our own constructionist analytics, we have resurrected a kind
of "cautious" (self-conscious) naturalism that addresses the
practical and sited production of everyday life (Gubrium,
1993a). More decidedly constructionist in its concern for takenfor-granted realities, this balances how and what concerns,
enriching the analytic impulses of each. ouch an analytics
focuses on the int"'1'lay, not the synthesis, of discursive practice
and discourses-in-practice, the tandem projects of cth nomethodolog)' and foucauldian discourse analysis. In doing so, the
analytics assiduously avoids theorizing social forms, lest the
discursive practices associated with the construction of these
forms be taken tor granted. By the same token, it concertedly
keeps institutional or cultural discourses in view, lest they be
dissolved into localized displays of practical reasoning or forms
of sequential organization for talk- in-interaction. first and toremost, a constructioni.st analytics of interpretive practice has
taken us, in real time, to the "going concerns}) of everyday Jjfe, as
Everett Hughes (1984) liked to call social institutiuns. This
approach focuses attention on how members artfully put distinct discourses to work as they constitute their social worlds.
Interplay connotes the acceptance of a dynamic relation.ship,
not a to-be-resolved tension, between the hows and whats of
interpretive practice. We have intentionally avoided analytically

privileging either discursive practice or discourse.s-in-practice.
Putting it in ethnomethodological terms, in our view the aim of
a constructionist analytics is to document the int,erolavbel1<e1'11
the practical reason ing and interactive machinery entailed in •
constructing a sense of everyday reality, on the one naIlU, ,IllO
the institutional conditions, resources, and related d,i's,cowrSe! •
that substantively nourish and interpretively mediate interaction on the other. Putting it in Foucal~dia n terms, the goal is
describe the interplay between institutional discourses and
"dividing practices" that constitute local subjectivities and i
domains of experience (Foucault 1965) . The symmetry of fe~- '
world practice has encouraged us to give equal treatment to
both its articulative and substantive engagements.
Constructionist researchers have increasingly emphasized
the interplay between the two sides of interpretive
i
They are scrutin i,ing both the artful processes and thosubstao'
tive conditions of meaning making and social order, evenif the
commitment to a multiiaceted analytics sometimes remains
implicit. Douglas Maynard (19R9), for example, notes that most :
ethnographers have traditionally asked, "How do parl:icipan[\.
see things?" while ethnomethodologically informed disc:ou"", :
studies have asked, "How do participants do things?" WhllleJu.
own work typically begins with the later question,
cautions us not to ignore the former. He explains that, in
interest of studying how members do things, ethnofnettlOd·
ologie-a! studies have tended to deemphasiZe factors that
tion their actions. Recogniling that "external social .s t nJCtulre ~l ·
used as a reso urce for social interaction at the same time as
co nstituted within it" (p. 139); Maynard suggests that
graphic and discourse studies can be mutually infimrlati",
allowing researchers to better document the ways in which "structure of interaction, while being a local production,
taneously enacts matters whose origins are externally ..
(p. 139). "In addition to knowing how people 'see their workaday worlds;' writes Maynard (p. 144), researchers should try to
understand how people "discover and exhibit featureS of
worlds so that they can be 'seen:"
Maynard (2003) goes on to note signitlcant differences in the •
way talk and interaction typically are treated in conversation
analytic versus more naturalistic, ethnographic approaches to.
social process. His own work, like many similarly groundedt:t .
studies, exploits what Maynard terms the "limited amnity'
between CA concerns and methods and more field-based ethnographic techniques and se)lsibilities (see Maynard, 2003,.
chapter 3)_While a broad-based constructionist analytics would
argue for a deeper, more "mutual affinity" (lvlaynard, 21103) _,
between attempts to describe the haws and whats of socialpractice, there is clearly common ground, with much of Ihe
enee a matter of emphasis or analytic point of departure.
Expressing similar interests and concerns, Hugh H _L_",_
developed a discourse-oriented program of "constiUltive
nography" that puts "structure and structuring activities
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equal footing by showing how the social facts of the world emerge
from structuring work to become external and constraining"
(1979, p.18, emphasis in the original). Mehan examines "contrastive" instances of interpretation in order to describe both fbe
'distal" and "proximate" featnres of the reality-constituting work
people do '\\~fbin institutional, cultural, and historical contexts"
11991, pp. 73, 81).
Beginning from similar ethnomethodological and discourse
analytic footings, David Silverman (1993) likewise attends to
the institutional venues of talk and social construction (Silverman,
1985,1997). Seeking a mode of qualitative inquiry that exhibits
both constitutive and contextual impulses, he suggests that
discourse studies that consider the varied institutional contexts
o!talk bring a new perspective to qualitative inquiry. Working in
the same vein, Gale Miller (1994, 1997b) has proposed "ethnographies of institutional disconrse" that serve to document "the
ways in which setting members use discursive resources in
organizing their practical actions, and how members' actions
are constrained by the resources available in the settings"
(Miller, 1994, p. 280). This approach makes explicit overtures to
both conversation analysis and Foucauldian discourse analysis
(see Miller, 1997a, and Weinberg, 2005) for rigorous empirical
demonstrations of analytic interplay.
Dorothy Smith (1987, 1990a, 1990b) has been similarly
explicit in addressing a version of the interplay between the
whats and hows of social life from a feminist point of view,
pointing to the critical consciousness made possible by the
perspective. Hers has been an analytics initially informed by
ethnomethodological and, increasingly, foucauldian sensibilities. Moving beyond ethnomethodo!ogy, she calls for what
she refers to as a "dialectics of discourse and the everyday"
(Smith, 1990a, p. 202).
Aconcern for interplay, however, should not result in integrating an analytics of discursive practice with an analytics of
discourse-in-practice. To integrate one with the other is to
reduce the empirical_purview of a parallel enterprise. Reducing the analytics of discourse-in-practice into discursive
practice risks losing the lessons of attending to institutional
difterences and cultural configurations as they mediate, and
are not "just talked into being" through, social interaction.
Conversely, figuring discursive practice as the mere residue of
institutional discourse risks a totalized marginalization of
local artfulness.

Analytic Bracketing
A constructionist analytics that eschews synthesis or integration requires procedural flexibility and dexterity fbat cannot
be captured iu mechanical scriptures or formulas. Rather, the
analytic process is more like a skilled juggling act, alternately
concentrating on fbe myriad haws and whats of everyday life.
This requires a new form of bracketing to capture the interplay
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between discursive practice and discourses-in-practice. We
refer to this technique of oscillating indifference to the construction and realities of everyday life as "analytic bracketing"
(see Gubrium & Holstein, 1997). While we have given it a name, it
resonates anonymously in ofber constructionist analytics.
Recall that ethnomethodology's interest in fbe hows by
which realities are produced requires a studied, temporary
indiffereuce to those realities. Ethnomefbodologists typically
begin their analysis by setting aside belief in the objectively real
in order to bring into view fbe everyday practices by which
subjects, objects, and events come to have an accountable sense
of being observable, rational, and orderly. 'fhe ethnomethodological project moves forward from there, documenting how
discursive practice constitutes social action and order by identif)~ng the particular interactional mechanisms at play. Ludwig
Wittgenstein (J 953, p. J9) is instructive as he advocates taking
language "off holiday" in order to make visible how language
works to produce the objects it is ofberwise viewed as principally describing.
Analytic bracketing works somewhat differently. It is
employed throughout analysis, not just at the start. As analysis
proceeds, the researcher intermittently orients to everyday
realities as both fbe products of members reality-constructing
procedures and as resources from which realities are reflexively
'constituted. At one moment, the researcher may be indifferent
to the snuctures of everydey life in order to document their
production through discursive practice. In the next analytic
move, he or she brackets discursive practice in order to assess
the local availability, distribution, and/or regulation of resources
for reality construction. In YVittgensteinian terms) this trans-

lates into attending to both language-at -work and language-onholiday, alternating considerations of how languages games, in
particular institutional discourses, operate in everyday life and
what games are likely to come into play at particular times and
places. In Foucauldian terms, it leads to alternating considerations of discourses-in-practice on the one hand and the locally
Hne-grained documentation of related discursive practices on
the other.
Analytic bracketing amounts to an orienting procedure for
alternately focusing on the whats tllen the haws of interpretive
practice (or vice versa) in order to assemble both a contextually
scenic and a contextually constitutive picture of everyday
language-in-use. The objective is to move back and forth
behveen discursive practice and discourses-in-practice) documenting each in turn, and making informative references to the
otller in the process. Eifber discursive machinery or available discourses and/or constraints becomes the provisional phenomenon, while interest in fbe other is temporarily deferred, but not
forgotten. The analysis of the constant interplay between the
hows and whats of interpretive practice mirrors the lived interplay
between social interaction and its immediate surroundings,
resources) restraints) and going concerns.
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Because discursive practice and discourses-in-practice are
mutually constitutil'e, one cannot argue definitively that analysis
should begin or end with either one, although there are predilections in this regard. Smith (1987, 199Oa, 199Ob), for example,
advocates beginning "where people are"; we take her to mean
the places where people are concretely located in the institutional landscape of everyday life. Conversely, conversation analysts insist on beginning with discursive practice (i.e., everyday
conversation), even while a variety of unanalyzed whats typically inform their efforts.
Wherever one starts, neither the cultural and institutional
details of discourse nor its real-time engagement in social interaction predetermines the other. If we set aside the need for an
indisputable resolution to the question of which comes first,
last, or has priority, we can designate a suitable point of departure and proceed from there, so long as we keep firmly in mind
that the interplay within interpretive practice requires that we
mOl'e hack and forth analytically between its facets. In the service of not reifying the components, researchers continuously
remind themselves that the analytic task centers on the dialectics of two fi elds of play, not the reproduction of one by the other.
While we advocate no rule for where to begin, we need not
fret that the overall task is impossible or logically incoherent.
Maynard (1998, p. 344), for example, compares analytic bracketing to "wanting to ride trains that are going in different directions, initially hopping on one and then somehow jwnping to
the other:' He asks, "How do you jump from one train to another
when they are going in different directions?" The question is, in
fact, merely an elaboration of the issue of how one brackets in
the first place, which is, of course, the basis for Maynard's and
other ethnomethodologists' and conversation analysts' own
projects. The answer is simple: knowledge of the principle of
bracketing makes it possible.Those who bracket the lifeworld or
treat it indifferently, as the case might be, readily set aside
aspects of social reality every time they get to work on their
respective corpuses of empirical materia1.!t becomes as routine
as rising in the morning, having breakfast, and going to the
workplace:' On the other hand, the desire to operationalize
bracketing of any kind, analytic bracketing included, into
explicitly codified and sequenced procedural mOves would turn
bracketing into a set of recipe-like, analytic directives, something surely to be avoided. We would assume that no one, except
the most recalcitrant operationalist, would waD! to substitute a
recipe book for an analytic •. '
The alternating.tocus on discursive practice and discoursesin-practice reminds us not to appropriate either one naively
into our analysis. [t help.. sustainethnomethodology's important aim of distinguishing between members' resources and
our own. Analytic bracketing is always substantively temporary. It resists full-blown attention to discourses as systems of
power/knowledge, separate from how these operate .in lived
experience. It also is enduringly empirical in that it docs not

take the everyday operation of discourses for
truths of a setting (Olll court.'

Resisting Totalization
Located at the crossroads
discourses-in -practice, a mr""nc";nr,;,I,n,,Iv';mco,\",
analytic totalization or reduction. It accommodates
cal realities of choice and action, allowing the analytic
to capture the interplay of structure and process. It
propensity of a Foucauldian analytics to view all
as artifacts of particular regimes of po'wer/kn.owled%e,]
in relation to the broad sweep of his "histories of the .
Foucault was inclined to overemphasiu the
.
discourses in constructing the horizons of meaning.;
times or places, conveying the sense that d.i· scoUI":S lui
the nuances of ever)'day life. A more interactionalIy
analytics of discourse- one operating in tandem wuh
discursive practice-resists this tendency.
Because interpretive practice is mediated by
through institutional objectives and functioning,
of power/knowledge can be discerned in the myriad
cerns of everyday life. Yet, those matters that one
site brings to bear are not necessarily what another
practice. Institutions constitute distinct, \'etsornetim~1 Ql
ping, realities. V\~,i1c an_organized setllill~: m"y d''Ploy,
confers agency or subjectivit y upon individuals, for
another may constitute subjectivity along different lines
example, Gubrium, 1992.: Miller, 1997a; Weinberg,
If interpretive practice is complex and fluid,it is
arbitrary.Jn the practice of everydaylife, discourse'
in myriad sites and is socially variegated; actors
build up their intersubjective realities in Glvers",IO(:atlrl
and biographically informed terms. This allows
slippage in how discourses do their work; it is far
the apparently uniform, hegemonic regimes of
edge in some Foucauldian readings. Discernible social
tion nonetheless is evident in the going conCerns
participants, to which they hold their talk and
accountable.
Accordingly, a constructionist analytics ""J, w';lh th,
nial question of what realities and/or subjectivititj
constructed in the myriad sites of everyday iife (see
1999). In practice, diverse articulations of discourse '
collide, and work against the construction of common
form subj"'ts, agcnts, and social realities. Inl.,m,'.',II;'
in relation to tbe institutional and cultural markers
ence, which, in turn, fiuctuate with respect to the '
in which social interaction unfolds. Di,IC01JfS,:s-ill"
refract one another as they arc methodically""'""'''"
cal exigencies. Local discursive practice makes
impossible, instead serving up irUlovation, di',-ersificati<
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variation (see Abu-Lughod, 1991, 1993; Chase, 1995; Narayan &
George, 2002).

DIVERSE DIRECTIONS

Considering and emphasizing diverse analytic dimensions,
variations on the constructionist analytics of interpretive practice continue to develop in innovative directions. Some are 110\"/
"maturing:' such as the "institutional ethnography" (IE) that
Dorothy Smith and her colleagues have pioneered, and continue
to expand. Others are of more recent vintage, such as the growth
of discursive constructionism or Gubrium and Holstein's (2009)
development of a constructionist analytics for narrative practice. Old or new, in their own fashions all take up the interplay of
discursive practice and discourscs-in-practice, variously
emphasizing the hows and the whals of everyday life.
Ethnography of Narrative Practice
Let us begin with a recent development centered on how to
analyze the interpretive practices associated with narrative and
storytelling. Karralive analysis has become a popular mode of
qualitative inquiry over the pasttwo decades. If (almost) everyone is a constructionist, today nearly everyone also seems to be
doing what they call narrative analysis. As sophisticated and
insightful as the new wave of narrative analysis has become,
of this research is focused closely on texts of talk (e.g.,
Riessman, 1993). Researchers collect stories in interviews about
myriad aspects of social life, then the stories are transcribed and
analyzed for the way they emplot, thematize, and otherwise construct what they are about.
While attempts at narrative analysis have evinced constructionist sensibilities from the start, the socially situated, unfolding activeness of the narrative process has been shortchanged.
The emphasis on the transcribed texts of stories tends to strip
narratives of their social organization and interactional dynamics) casting narrative as a social product, not as social process.
Emphasis is more on the text-based whats of the story and how
is organized, than on the hows of narrative production. Paul
Atkin,;on (1997). among others, promotes a shift in focus:
The ubiquity of the narrative and its centrality. , , are not license
simply to privilege those forms. It is the work of anthropologists
and sociologists to examine those narratives and to sub.iect them
to the same analysis as any other forms. We need to par dLle attention to their construction in usc: how actors improvise their personal narratives .... Vlenccd to attend to how socially shared
resources of rhetoric and narrative are deployed togeneratt: recognizable, plausible, and culturally well-informed accounts. (p. 341)

This reorientation encourages researchers to consider the
circumstances, conditions, and goals of narratives----:-hovl

The Constructionist Analytics of Interpretive Practice lW 349

storytellers work up and accomplish things with the accounts
they produce. Adapting once morc from Wittgenstein (1953,
1958), storytellers not ordytdl stories, they do things with them.
Capitalizing on Atkinson"s and others suggestion, we have
recently turned our brand of constructionist analytics to issues
of narrative production (see Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). The
challenge is to capture narrative's active, socially situated
dimensions by moving outside of story texts to the occasions
and practical activities of story construction and storytelling.
By venturing into the domain of narrative practice, we gain
access to the content of accounts and their internal organization, to the communicative conditions and resources surrounding how narratives are assembled, conveyed, and received, and
to storytelling'S everyday consequences.
The focus on practice highlights the reflexive interplay
bet'i-veen discursive practice and discourse-in-practice. The narrative analysis of story transcripts may be perfectly adequate for
capturing the internal dynamics and organization of stories, but
it isolates those stories from their interactional and institutional
moorings. For example, a transcript may not reveal a setting's
discursive conventions, such as what is usually talked about,
avoided, or discouraged under the circumstances. It may not
reveal the consequences of a particular narrative told in a specillc way. In order to understand how narrative operates in
everyday life, we need to know the details and mediating conditions of nanative occasions. These details can only be discerned
from direct consideration of the mutually constitutive interplay
between ,,,,hat we have called ('narrative work''' and <'narrative
environments:'
Narrative work refers to the interactional activity through
,,,,,,hich narratives are constructed, communicated, sustained, or
reconfigured. The leading questions here are, "How can the process of constructing accounts be conceptuallzedt' and "Hm,\-T can
the empirical process be analyzed?" Some of this is visible in
story transcripts, but typically, narrative analysts tend to strip
these transcripts of tlleir interactional and institutional contexts and conversational character. This commonly results in the
transcribed narrative appearing as a more-or-less finished, selfcontained product. The in situ work of producing the narrative
within the !low of conversational interaction disappears.
To recapture some of this narrative activity, ".~e examine
narrative practice for some of the ways in which narratives are
activated or incited (see Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, 2000b).
Working by way of analytic bracketing, these studies concentrate on conversational dynamics, machinery~ and emerging
sequential environments (many traditional CA concerns),
while retaining sensitivity to broader contextual issues. Other
studies focus on narrative linkages and composition, the ways
in which horizons of meaning are narratively constructed (see
Gubrium, 1993b; Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). Studies of narrative performativity document the ways in which narratives are
produced and conveyed in and for particular circumstances
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and audiences (see Bauman, 1986; Abu-Lughod, 1993; Ochs &
Holstein, 2008, 2009).' Applied to stor ytelling, this ethnographic
Capps, 2001). Collaboration and control are additional key con approach is attuned to the discursive dynamics and contours of
cerns in analyzing narrative practice (see Holstein & Gubrium,
narrative practice. It provides opportunities for the close scru·
1995, 2000b; Norrick, 2000; Young, 1995). Because they are
tiny of narrative circumstances, their actors, and actions in the
interactionally produced, narratives are eminently social
process of constructing acco unts. This clearly resonates witb
accomplishments.
contextually rich work done ill the ethnography of communica·
The other side of our anal)1ics of narrative practice centers
tion (Hymes, 1964), the study of orally performed narratives
on narrative environments-contexts within which the work of
(Baumilll, 1986; Briggs & Bauman, 1992; Oehs & Capp,,2001j,
narrative construction gets done. Narratives are assembled and
and ethnographically grounded studies of folk narratives
told to someone, somewhere, at some time, with a variety of
(Glassie, 1995,2006).
consequences for those concerned. (In contrast to CA, we do not
Concern with the production, distribution, and circulation of
limit narrative environments to the machinery of speech
stories in society requi res that we step outside of na rrative texts
exchanges.) AUof this has a discernible impact on how stories
and consider questions such as who produces particular kinds
emerge, whai is communicated, and to what ends. The environof stories, where are they likely to be encountered, what are their
ments of storytelling shape the content and internal organizapurposes and consequences, who are the listeners, under what
tion of accounts) just as internal matters can have an impact on
circumstances are particular narratives more or less accountone's role as a storyteller. In turning to narrative environments,
able, how do they gain acceptance, and how are they challenged?
the analytic emphasis is more on the whats of narrative reality
Ethnographic fieldwork helps supply the answers. In systemati·
than on its hows, although, once again, analytic bracketing
cally observing the construction, use, and reception of nana·
makes this a matter of temporary emphasis, not excl usiye focus.
tives, we have found that their internal organi'<ltion, while
One key question here is, "How is the meaning of a narrative
important to understand in its own right, does not tell us much
influenced by the particular setting in whiclh it is produced, with
about how stories operate in society. This does not diminish the
the setting's distinctive understandings, concerns, and resources,
explanatory value of text-based narrative analysis, but instead
rather than in another setting, with different circumstances?" A
highlights what might be added to that approach if we attended
second question is,"What are the purposes and consequences of ' .. to narrative practice.
narrating experience ill particular ways!" A turn to the narrative
environments of storytelling is critical for understanding what
Institutional Ethnography
is at stake for storytellers and listeners in presenting accounts or
Another approaclh relating discursive practice and discoutleresponding to them in distinctive ways.
A growing body of work addresses such questions in relation
in-practice is Smith's "institutional ethnography" (IE) 'csearch
programS IE emerged out of Smith's (1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1999,
to formal and informal settings and organizations, from families, to friendship networks, professions, and occupations (see
2005) feminist work that explored the ruptures between women's
Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). The comparative ethnographies of
everyday experience and dominant forms of knowledge that,
while seemingly neutral and general, concealed particular standtherapeutic organizations conducted by Miller (1997a) and
points grounded in gender, race, and class (McCoy, 2008). The
Weinberg (2005) are exemplary in this regard. The inlluence of
narrative environments is portrayed even more strikingly in Out
approach takes the everyday world as both its point of departllrr
of Control: Family· Therapy and Domestic Disorder (Gubrium,
and its problematic. Inquiry begins with ongoing activities of
actual people in the world, "starting where people are;' as Smith
1992), which describes the narrative production of domestic
troubles in distinctly different family therapy agencies. Susan
characteristically puts it. The aim is to map the translaeal processes of administration and governance that shape lives and
Chase's (1995) Ambiguous Empowerment: The Work Narratives
of Women School Superintelldellts and Ami r 1larvasti', (2003)
circumstances by way of the linkages of ruUng relations. Recog·
nizing that such connections are accomplished primarily through
Being Homeless: Textual and Narrative Construelions offer
what is often called tex1ually mediated social organization, IE
nuanced exami nations of the accounts of some of society's most
focuses on texts-in-use in multiple settings. Across a range of
and least successful members, accenting the environmentally
locations-embodying people's everyday concerns, professional,
sensitive narrative work that is done to construct vastly different
administrative and management practices, and policy makingaccounts of life and its clhallenges.
IE studies examine the actual activities that coordinate these
To move beyond transcribed lexts, narrative analysis requires
interconnected
sites (see DeVault & McCoy,2002).
a methodology that captures the broad and variegated landscape
The dominant form of coordination is what Smith calls "rulof narrative practice. 1.0 essence, the researcher must be willing to
move outside stories themselves and into the interactional, culing relations" -a mode of knowledge that involves the "contin-
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in texts as a site of action" (Smith, 1987, p. 3). In IE,
orients the analyst to forms of representation (written
visual, digital, or numeric) that exist materially separate
embodied consciousness. Such texts provide mediating
between people across time and place, making it
to generate knowledge separate from individuals who
such knowledge. Modern governance and large·scale
~ot(linaltion occur through rapidly proliferating, generalized,
generalizing, text-based forms of knowledge. These texts
the "ruling relations [that generate 1 forms of conand organization that are objectified in the sense
they are constituted externally to particular people and
2005, p. 13). But to appreciate how texts do their
oordinal:ive· work, the researcher must view them "in action" as
produced, used, and oriented to by particular people in
institutional courses of action (see DeVault & McCoy,
Therein lie the institutional and ethnographic dimensions of
leaplproach. In IE, "institution" refers to coordinated and interwork processes and courses of action. "Ethnography"
wncrete modes of inquiry used to discover and describe
activities. The IE researcher's goal is not to generalize
people under study, but to identify and explain social
that have generalizing effects. Practitioners of IE
~lfacteristically have critical or liberatory goals, an aim that
address shortly. They pursue inquiry to elucidate the
deol,agic:al and social processes that produce the experience of
wmilnati()D and subordination. As Smith and colleagues often
out, institutional ethnography offers a sociology for peojust about them (see DeVault & McCoy, 2002; McCoy,
t.1R· .llmith2005).
1Ylwt:1Lis not typically categorized as a variant of construe(McCoy, 2008), its conceptual antecedents and empiriinterests often converge with the general constructionist
especially with respect to the ways in which discursive
and constraints affect social life and social forms,
on textually (discursively) mediated social relations,
examine how forms of consciousness and organizaobjectified or constituted as if they were external to
people and places. IE analysis, however, strives to
that, at the same time, seemingly obdurate forms of social
re realized in concerted actions-produced, used, and

to by actual persons in ongoing, institutional courses
(McCoy, 2008; Smith, 2005). From the standpoint ofIE,
";"t,",·,),,, between structures and agency is key to the social
trganiizati(JU of lived experience.
As an alternative "sociology for people;' IE has been adopted
researchers working in a wide variety of disciplines and
in education, social work, nursing and other health
as well as sociology (see McCoy 2008; Smith, 2006).
a general sense, IE addresses the socially organized and
"work" done in varied domains of everyday life.
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Work is construed in a very broad sense-activities that
involve conscious intent and acquired skill; including emotional and thought work as well as physical labor or communicative action. It is not confined to occupational employment,
although this form of work is also ripe for analysis. Marjorie
DeVault (1991), for example, has examined the work of feeding
a family, while several IE studies have investigated various
aspects of mothers' experience and the deeply consequential
mothering work done by women in diverse domestic and organizational settings (see Brown, 2006; Griffith & Smith, 2004;
Weigt, 2006). Other studies have examined the situated experience of living with HIY infection (Mykhalovskiy & McCoy,
2002), child rearing and housing (Luken & Vaughan, 2006),
nursing home care (Diamond, 1992), and job training and
immigrant labor (Grahame, J 998). IE investigations conducted in more formal (occupational) work settings include
studies of the work performed by teachers (Manicom, 1995),
security guards (Walby, 200j), social workers (De Montigny,
1995), nurses (Campbell & Jackson, 1992; Rankin & Campbell,
2006), and policing in the gay community (G. Smith, 1988).
Across these IE studies, the goal is to discover how lives are
socially organized and coordinated. The analytic basis for all
these projects is to display the interplay between institutional
practices and individual actions. If IE resists a constructionist
designation, it nonetheless shares many of the sensibilities
embodiedm a constructionist analytics.

Discursive Constructionism
Another innovative approach has been grouped loosely
under the banners of discursive constructionism, or DC, and
discourse analysis, or DA (see Potter, 1996; Potter & Hepburn,
2008). Its constructionist analytics also centers on the interplay
of interpretive practice. As Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn
(2008) note, the DC label is itself a construction that supplies a
particular sense of coherence to a body of more-or-Iess related
work. If it is not singularly programmatic, it nevertheless represents a cogent analytic perspective that addresses the reflexive
complexity of social interaction.
Centering attention on everyday conversations, arguments,
talk-at-work, and other occasions where people are interacting,
DC focuses on action and practice rather than linguistic structure. The approach emerged from the discourse analytic tradition in the sociology of scientific knowledge (e,g., Gilbert &
Mulkay, 1984) and withi.n a broader perspective developed
within social psychology (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987; see
Hepburn, 2003). It is indebted in many ways to ethnomethodology (especially work by Harvey Sacks), and draws heavily on CA
methods and findings. DC differs from CA, however, because it
explicitly brings substantive issues of social construction to the
fore; it is more concerned with the whats of social interaction
than CA generally has been, While there are many other subtle
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distinctions, areas of overlap are substantial (Wooftltt, 2005),
and in recent years DC and CA have found increasing areas of
convergence (Potter & Hepburn, 2008).
DC approaches social construction in two fashions. In one)
investigation aims to describe how discourse is constructed in
the sense that it is assembled from a range of different resources
with different degrees of structural organization. At the most
basic level, these resources are words and grammatical structures, but they also include broader elements such as categories,
metaphors, idioms, rhetorical conventions, and interpretive repertoires. The second approach emphasizes the constructive
aspects of discourse in the sense that assemblages of words, repertoires, categories, and the like assemble and produce stabilized
versions of the world and its actions and events. Central to DC is
the notion that discourse does far more than describe objective
states of affairs; it is llsed to construct versions of the 'world that
are organized for particular purposes (Potter & Hepburn, 2008).
Following this commitment, DC treats all discourse as situated. At one level, it is located in the sequential environment of
conversation (see Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) and other
forms of mediated interaction (e.g., turn allocation in legal or
medical proceedings, screen prompts on computer displays). On
another level, discourse is institutionally embedded. That is, it is
generated within, and gives sense and structure to routine,
ongoing practices such as family conversations, shopping transactions, and twelve-step meetings, for example. On a third level,
discourse is situated rhetorically, in that discursive constructions are produced to advocate a particular version and counters
possible alternatives (Potter & Hepburn, 2008). In this regard,
analysis of the interest-related and consequential whats of discursive constructions is imperative.
V,chile DC incorporates a view of discourse-in-practice, it
stops short of the extended notion of discourse used in some of
Foucault's work. DC's view of discourse is more restricted,
emphasizing its use in everyday practice. Nevertheless, DC is
dynamic and flexible enough to potentially address phenomena
that Foucauldian analysis might also contemplate, or to conscript some of Foucault's insights about institutions, practice,
and the nature of subjectivity into its own service (Potter &
Hepburn, 2008). For example, Margret Wetherell (1998) argues
that social identities calmot be understood apart from consideration of the discourses that provide the subject positions
through which those identities are produced.
DC is not a "coherent and scaled system" (Potter & Hepburn,
2008, p. 291). Its field of interest is extremely broad, including
but not restricted to, studies in discursive psychology and social
psychology (e.g., Edwards, 2005; Edwards & Potter, 1992;
Hepburn, 2003; Potter, 2003; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), cognition
(e.g., Potter & te Molder, 2005), race and racism (e.g., Wetherell
& Potter, 1992), gender (see Speer & Stokoe, in press), age (e.g.,
Nikander, 2002), facts (e.g., Wooffitt, 1992), and emotion
(Edwards, 1999).

DC is not without its analytic tensions. For example, the issue
of social structure and context remains a subject of debate.
There is considerable contention regarding how the researcher
might analyze utterances within conversation with an eye to
identifying transcending disconrses'csubject positions, or repertoires. As in Foucauldian or critical discourse analysis (see, for
example, Fairclough, 1995; Van Dijic, 1993; Wodak & Meyer,
2009), the issue is how critically to address the substantive
whats of social construction while attending to the interactional
dynamics and circumstances that construct them (Wooffitt,
2005). The danger in turning too fully to the study of transcendent discourse (writ large) is that it can shortchange the artful
human conduct and agency involved in discursive practice
(Wooffitt,2005).
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SUSTAINING A CRITICAL CONSCIOUSI\ESS

This brings us to the concluding issue of how to maintain a
critical consciousness in constructionist research while

upholding a commitment to the neutral stance of bracketing.
We have just noted that this is a desire shared by both DC and
IE. But it does pose competing aims: documenting the social
construction of reality, on the one hand, and criticallyattending to dominant and marginalized discourses and their effects
on oUr-lives, on the other. Exclusive attention to the construc"
tive hows of interpretive practice cannot by itself sustain a
critical consciousness.
Our way of addressing the issue comes by way of analytic
bracketing. Our constructionist analytics sustains a critical
consciousness by exploiting the critical potential of the analytic
interplay of discourse-in-practice and discursive practice.
Attending to both the constitutive haws and substantive wha~
of interpretive practice provides two different platforms for
critique. The continuing enterprise of analytic bracketing does
not keep us comfortably ensconced thronghout the research
process in a domain of indifterence to the lived realities of "'P'rience, as phenomenological bracketing does. Nor does anal)1ic
bracketing keep us engaged in the unrepentant naturalism of
documenting the world of everyday life as if it were fully objective and obdurate. Rather, it continuously rescues us from the
analytic lethargies of both endeavors.
When questions of discourse-in-practice take the stage,
there are grounds for problemati.ing or politicizing what
wise might be too facilely viewed as socially or individualistically constructed, managed, and sustained. The persistent
urgency of what questions cautions us not to assume
agency, artfulness, or the machinery of social interaction'
whole story. The urgency prompts us to inquire into broader
environments illld contingencies that are built up ernn.«time
and circumstance in discursive practice. These are the
poraneous conditions that inform and shape the construction
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Chapter 20
and the personal and interpersonal consequences of
constituted the world in a particular way. While a conview toward interpretive practice does not orient
i!~ra.listi call!y to the "real world" as such, neither does it take
as built from the ground up in talk-in-interaction
and every communicative occasion. This allows for
lin"l" 'oolirie,1observations since the analytics can point us
matters of social organization and control that implicate
beyond immediate interaction. It turns us to wider
(as constructed as they may be) in search of sources of
,control, change, or stability.
discursive practice commands the analytic spotlight,
grounds for critically challenging the representational
of taken-far-granted realities. Researchers unsettle
fu."'Cc'nstl:uct taken-for-granted realities in search of their
to reveal the constitutive processes that produce
them. Criticaily framed , persistent how questions
us to bear in mind that the everyday realities of our
;- j,hether they are being normal, abnormal, law-abiding,
·,mal,maIe,female, young, or old-are realities we do. Havtbem, they can be undone. We can move on to dis and reassemble realities, producing and reproducing,
again, the world we inhabit. Politically, tbis recogni zes
the world we inhabit, we could enact alternate possibilittPr ,/t"rn;ati,'edirecti,ons, even if commonsense understandthis seem impossible. If we make visible the confluidity and malleability of social forms, we also reveal
for change (see Gubr ium & Holstein, 1990, 1995;
& Gubrium, 1994, 2000b, 2004, 2008).
critical consciousness -of a constructionist analytics
the continuous imperative to take issue with discourse
<lli,:urs,i',"e practice when either one is foregrounded in
or seemingly obdurate in everyday life, thus turning
,ana'YlilCs on itself as it pursues its goals. In this sense, anab"tck"tirlg is its own form of critical consciousness.
framed, tbe interplay of discourse-in-practice and
practice transforms analytic bracketing into critical
offering a basis not only for documenting interprebut also for critically commenting on its own
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closer to the version comTeyed in the work of Melvin Palloer (1987,

1991) and D. Lawrence Wieder (1988) than some of the more recent
"postanalytic" or com..ersation analytic forms of ethnomethodology.

Indeed, Garfinkel (1988,2002), Lynch (1993), and others might object
to how we ourselves portray ethnomcthodology. "We would contend,
however, that there is mllch to be gained fmm a studied "misreading"
of the ethnomethodological "classics," a practice that Garfinkel himself
advocates for the sociological classics more generally (see Lynch,
1993). With the figuralive "dealh of the author" (Rarthes, t 977), those
attached to doctrinaire readings of the canon should have little ground
for argument.
3. OLber elhnomethodologists have drawn upon Foucaldt, but
without necessarily endorsing these affinities or parallels. Lynch
((993), for example, wriles that Foucault's studies can be relevant to
ethnomethodological investigations in a "restricted and 'literal' way"
(p. ]31), and resists the generalization of discursive regimes across

highly occasioned "language games:' See McHoul ( 1986) and Lyocll
and Bogen (1996) for exemplary eth nomethodological appmpriations
of FoucauJdian insights.
4. There are other useful metaphors for describing how anal)~ie
bracketing changes the focus from discourse·in·practice to discursive
practice. One can liken the operation to shifting gears while driving a
motor vehicle equipped with a manu al transmission. One mode of
analysis may prove quite productive, but it will eventually strain
against the resistance engenuered by its own temporary analytic ori·
entation. When the researcher notes that the-analytic engine is laboringunder, orbcing constrained by, the rc.-straints of 'what it is currently
geared to accom-plish. she can decide tu virtually shift an a~'tic gears in
order to gain further purchase 0 11 the aspects of interpretive interplay
that were previously bracketed. Just as there can be no pft.'scription for
shifting gears while driving (i.e., one can never specify in advance at

what speed one should shift up or down), changing analytic brackets
always remains an artful enterprise, awaiting the empirical circumstances it encounters. Its timing cannot. be prespecified. I.ike shifting
gea rs while driving, changes are nol arbitrary or undiscipl i.ned. Rather
they respond to the analytic challenges at hand in a principled, if not
predelermined, fashion.

S. This may be the very thing Lynch (1993) decries with respect to
conversation analysts who attempt to formalize and professionalize
CA as a "scientific" discipline.
6. Some critics (sec Denzin, 1998) have worried that analytic
bracketing represents a sdcctive objectivism, u form of "ontological

gerrymandering." These, oi course, have become fighti ng words
among constructionists. But ·we should soberlrrecall that Steve 'Woolgar
and Dorothy Pawluch (l 985) have suggested that carving outsome
sort of analytic footing may be a pervasive and-unavoidable feature of
any sociological commentary. Our own constant attention to the interplay between discourse-in-practice and discursive practice continu; Some self-proclaimed ethnomethodologists, however, might
notion that ethnomethodology is in any sense a "conslruc"const ruc tivist" enterprise (see Lynch, 1993, 2008). Some
of the ethnomethodological canon also clearly imply that
:uucnOll.lsm is anathema to the ethnornethodological project (sec
1998; Maynard & Clayman, 1991 ).
dearly reflecting Garfinkel's pioneering contributions,
.th'~"teri"tion of the ethnomethodological project is perhaps

ally reminds us of their reflexive relationship. Gerrymanderers stand
their separate ground and unrefle:dvely dccnnstruct; analytic bracketing, incontrasl, encourages a continual and methodical deconstruction of empirical groundings themselves. This may produce a less-

than-tidy picture, bot it also is designed to keep rein.cation at bay and
ungrounded signification und er control.
7. The term "narrative ethnography;" \\'hicb is an apt d.esignation
for an elhnographic approach to narrative. is also associated with
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anodler approach to qualitative inqu iry.Some r.,earchers have applied
the term to the critical analysis of representational practices in ethnography. Their aim is to work against the objectifying practices of
ethnographic des.cription. Practitioners of this form of narrative ethnography use the term to highlight researchers' narrative praclices as
they craft ethnographic accounts. They feature the interplay between
the ethnographer's own subjectivity and the subjcctivities of those
whose lives and worlds are in view. Their ethnographic texts are typi. cally derived from participant observation, but afe distinctive because
they take special notice of the researcher's own participation, perspectiYe, voice, and especially his or her emotional experience as these
operate in relation to the field of experience in view. Anthropologists
Barbara Tedlock (1 991, 1992, 2004), Ruth Behar (1993, 1996), and
Kirin Narayan (1989), and sociologists Carolyn Ellis (1991), Laurel
Richardson (1990a, 1990b), and others (Ellis & Flaherty, 1992; hIlis &
Bochoer, 1996) are important proponents of this genre. The refieri,'e,
representational engagements of field encounters are discu.s:soo at
length in H. 1. Goodall's (2000) book \\\·iting the New Ethnography,
while Carolyn Ellis (2004) offers a description of the auto ethnographic
approach to narrari"oes.
8. According to McCoy (2008), institutional ethnographers generally resist the tendenc}" to be subsumed under the constructionist
umbrella. By not affiliating with constructionism, she argues, IE has
been free to partidpate 111 constructionist conversations, but on its
own terms. This independent posilioning is important for the IE project that aims to begin, not from theoretical vanlage points, but from
the actualities of people's lives.
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